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This study analyses factors related to attitudes toward European Union (EU)
accession, taking into account political affiliation, religious and ethnic identity,
fear of foreign threat, utilitarian considerations, along with a number of other
variables through a survey conducted among Turkish citizens in general and
also among various Alevi communities. The results show that Alevi identity, in
contrast to Kurdish background, was strongly indicative of positive attitudes
toward the EU. Furthermore, in conjunction with existing literature on EU inte-
gration, political party affiliation, utilitarian concerns and fear of foreigners were
associated with attitudes toward membership among all groups, while religiosity
was not a significant determinant of attitudes toward the EU.
Keywords: Turkey; European Union; public opinion; Alevis; Kurds; political
cueing
What determines social support for European Union (EU) membership in Turkey?
As the successor of a multi-religious, multi-ethnic empire, the Republic of Turkey,
under the guidance of the Kemalist modernization project, has always been a coun-
try officially pointed toward the west. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s well-known ambi-
tion for the fledgling Republic, ‘Reaching the level of contemporary civilizations’,
is still conceived as a relevant project for Turkey today. Although membership in
the EU is certainly only one possible interpretation or manifestation of this ambi-
tion, the relationship of the former with the latter is not missed on the Turkish pop-
ulation as a whole. However, an important issue as this heterogeneous nation
continues negotiations with the EU, itself a complex and heterogeneous body, is
what determinants influence the groundswell of support for or against EU member-
ship among Turkish citizens. Addressing the broader literature on EU integration in
general, this small study, based on a unique survey conducted in late spring and
early summer of 2009, takes into account the targeted variables in the literature with
a special focus on the impact of political party cueing and non-dominant cultural
status in determining one’s attitudinal position toward the EU. To discuss the latter,
particular emphasis was made to include within the sample the religiously distinct
Alevis, which comprise somewhere in the range of 10–25% of the population
(Poyraz 2005, 503), and citizens of Kurdish language background, also constituting
between 15 and 20% of the population (Heper 2007, 1).1
*Corresponding author. Email: mwuthrich@ku.edu
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies
Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2012, 45–62
ISSN 1468-3857 print/ISSN 1743-9639 online
































Measuring the relationship between social support and affiliation to political par-
ties in the Turkish case seems both a critical endeavour to understand the negotia-
tion process and an issue that has been underexplored through quantitative means.
While EU membership remained at the level of a theoretical or macro project, what
society at large thought about EU accession seemed not to be of great concern by
the political elites, and the leaders of the mainstream parties generally favoured a
westward focus. Since acceptance of candidacy in 1999 and particularly since nego-
tiations have formally commenced in 2005 (Yılmaz 2011), the nitty–gritty details of
reform that touch on sensitive social issues have given political opponents opportu-
nity to create social discomfort toward the idea of EU accession and its ‘imposi-
tions’ on the national status quo.2 Thus, it is important to consider how changes in
domestic politics and competition among political elites might impact attitudes
toward the EU. At this stage of EU–Turkey relations, it is hard not to see a connec-
tion between domestic politics, social attitudes and possibilities for advancement in
the EU negotiation process.
Furthermore, considering all the other intervening factors, how does one’s iden-
tity impact one’s orientation toward EU accession, including a strong affiliation with
one’s country and/or identification with a non-dominant cultural or religious com-
munity,3 such as the Kurds or Alevis? Does simply identifying with any non-domi-
nant group result in the same attitudinal outcome in this regard? During the process
of accession, of course, these groups’ status and relationship with the State could
have ramifications in Turkey’s EU membership process and the accompanying
democratization process. For the last 20 years, Turkey has been struggling with
internal and external affairs simultaneously, which have often been significantly
intertwined. It has had to improve its democracy on various levels to stay on course
with the EU; while doing so, it has had to face the question of granting wider cul-
tural and political rights to various ethnic, religious, cultural groups within the pop-
ulation as the EU has observed the developments closely and, at times, critically
(Grigoriadis 2009; Ulusoy 2009). How these groups, thus, approach the prospect of
EU membership and its consequences seems of interest.
This paper intends to bring the broader comparative literature on Europeaniza-
tion to bear on determinants of support for EU membership in Turkey, a process
initiated by Kentmen’s (2008) excellent article, which was nonetheless unable,
based on existing data, to address the question of political affiliation and cultural
minorities.4 In the following sections of this paper, we provide a brief outline of
Alevis and Kurds and their relations with the State and also the nature of domestic
politics in Turkey. Then we will consider this in light of the literature regarding the
EU, Europeanization and public attitudes in order to derive a number of hypotheses.
Following this, our survey and the research model will be discussed and the results
from the data will be presented. Finally, we will analyse the data and discuss where
this might lead future research on this topic.
Alevis, Kurds and politics in Turkey
The Alevis are a heterodox religio-cultural community united by their veneration of
the Turkish dervish, Hacı Bektaş who lived in the thirteenth century.5 His followers
diverged into two different communities in the Ottoman Empire – Bektaşi and
Kızılbaş/Alevi – but, rightly or wrongly, in modern parlance, these groups have
generally been discussed as one community under the umbrella term ‘Alevi’6






























(Melikoff 2003, 2). While they indeed share certain beliefs with Shiites, including
the veneration of Caliph Ali and the twelve Imams, their religious and cultural
practices have been distinctly shaped by their Anatolian roots. Alevis have had a
complex relationship with the Governments of Anatolia for hundreds of years. In
interviews with leaders of a number of Alevi communities in Istanbul, each of
which having distinguishing characteristics from the others, all of them, of their
own accord, brought up the claim that troubles between Alevis and other Muslims
began with the reign of Sultan Selim, the First (1512–1520),7 who according to
their accounts, brought in Sunni clerics from Egypt and began to impose Sunni
orthodoxy on the Anatolian populace, clamping down harshly on Alevis and others
with ‘non-orthodox’ belief systems (Goodwin 1998, 91). Many Ottoman leaders
like Selim assumed that Alevis were always potential supporters of the Shiite Safa-
vids in Persia, and the term ‘kızılbaş’ – literally ‘red head/top’ – referred to the red
turbans worn by those who apparently fought with the Safavids against the Ottoman
Porte (Shankland 2003, 19). The Bektaşi were generally closely tied to the janis-
saries of the Ottoman State and, thus, were largely in a favourable position until
Mahmud II abolished the janissary corps and officially closed down the Bektaşi
order in 1826 (Goodwin 1998, 298). Ottoman history indicates well that the manner
in which the State has defined and perceived Alevis has had important conse-
quences – one designation set them as a threat to the State, the other as largely
harmless or allied with the State.
Kurds, on the other hand, have historically been a collection of peoples that
have lived in the mountainous borderland that historically separated the Ottoman
Empire from and Safavids with Kurdish tribes occupying both sides of the divide.8
For the most part, these various tribal leaders were loyal to their patron-state as
long as they were given autonomy and allowed to maintain their existing sociopo-
litical structures (Heper 2007). With the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the divi-
sion of the Middle East after the First World War, Kurdish tribes found themselves
divided across Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, with the largest segment falling within
the boundaries of the modern Turkish Republic. Throughout Ottoman and Early
Republic history, one can find numerous tribes that supported or rebelled against
the Porte/State, often in opposition to one another, and with rebellions usually
occurring in response to encroachment and loss of autonomy in relation to the
Porte/State. While the imagined community of a Kurdish nation might have existed
in the minds of certain Kurdish elites and intellectuals for some time (along with
many European and American supporters who could easily envision a Kurdish
nationalist ideal), the actual evidence in Turkey of a grassroots ‘national’ Kurdish
identity, in its modern conceptualization, has largely been a post-1980 coup
phenomenon.
During the ‘nation-creating’ process led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the
group of elites who founded the Republic of Turkey,9 there were various invitations,
exclusions, inclusions, assimilations, integrations among the various segmented
groups (Kadıoğlu 1996; Çağaptay 2002). Within such a framework, Alevis and
Kurds in particular were often seen as ‘borderline’ groups in terms of national iden-
tification in the eyes of the State. A significant majority of Alevis, though certainly
not Sunni Muslim – a potential problem even for the secularists to the extent that it
was seen as obstacle to homogenization – were, at least, largely Turkish speaking.
Kurds were also a borderline group, especially those that refused to part with
their native language dialects and sociocultural practices, inhibiting effective






























centralization of the State in areas where this group predominated; on the other
hand, their long history of living side by side with Turks and a shared Sunni broth-
erhood encouraged the hope that they might eventually fuse as one within a Turkish
nation (Yeğen 2009).
Ultimately, which side of the border these groups ended up in the conceptualiza-
tion of the ‘nation’ depended on the apparent emphasis of the State on issues of lan-
guage and religion. Due to the unique nature of each of these large cultural groups,
their fortunes with the State – at least their fortunes as perceived by many members
of these two groups – often rose and fell in inverse relation to one another. While
Kemalists had firm control of the State, they were viewed with favour by Alevis and
relations were largely harmonious. To the extent that a unified language and culture
and a centralized State were emphasized, the State was often at odds with Kurdish
citizens. During periods where Islamists, like those in the National Outlook (Milli
Görüş) movement primarily led by Necmettin Erbakan, had greater influence in poli-
tics, they seemed to forge stronger connections with Sunni Kurds, while Alevis (and
certainly also Kurdish Alevis) viewed them with suspicion.10
The political participation of these groups at the national level has demonstrated
both similarities and divergence. A common claim about Alevis and politics is that
they support the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi [CHP]) in
large numbers because of their long-observed love for the Republican reforms and
for Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Turkish Republic, the legacy of
whom continues in the party he founded, the CHP. The evidence for this is that dur-
ing the first three decades of the multiparty system (1950–1980), the CHP’s stron-
gest centre of support existed in the eastern region of the country, which has
historically been densely populated by Alevis. Shankland (2003, 21) has also
observed the love Alevis have for Atatürk and his principles, and these, particularly
through the establishment of secularism, offered Alevis protection from religious
persecution. Erman and Göker (2000, 111) point out the emphasis in more recent
history that one of the largest Alevi associations, Cem Vakfı, places on Kemalism
and the Republican ideals. Though some Alevis experimented with the formation of
a political party that would be sympathetic to Alevis in the late 1960s and through
the 1970s (the Unity Party) and their historical sympathies toward socialist and
communist parties have been noted (Aringberg-Laanatza 2003; Shankland 2003).
They are believed to be one of the communities that have faithfully supported Ata-
türk’s party (CHP) in large numbers (Çarkoğlu 2005; Grigoriadis 2006).
Kurdish voters, on the other hand, have been notoriously volatile when it comes
to national elections and party affiliation largely due to mobilization through local
tribal leaders, large landowners and religious authorities who frequently switched
their allegiance, particularly during the pre-1980 period (Grigoriadis 2006, 450).
While Kurds initially voted for the CHP in large numbers in the southeast, by the
1970s, it was the region providing the least support for this party. Throughout the
first decades of the multiparty system in Turkey, the southeast region was associated
with the highest levels of electoral volatility and independent candidates (Dorrons-
oro and Watts 2009; Wuthrich 2011). Following the 1980 military coup and the
return to politics in 1983, Kurdish voters tended to fall into two general tendencies.
One segment of the Kurdish electorate tended to respond favourably to parties with
religious-conservative appeal or those who had strong ties to Sufi religious orders
among Kurds (Yalçın-Heckmann 1990; Duran 1998). Another significant population
of Kurds in the southeast have supported pluralist, social justice parties on the






























‘political left’. In the 1980s, this segment of support gravitated to the successor to
the CHP, which was closed down during the military regime in 1981, the Social
Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti [SHP]). The Kurdish leftist
political leadership mobilizing this electorate among Kurds ultimately broke off and
founded their own party, the People’s Labour Party, which initially formed an elec-
tion coalition with SHP in 1991 but ran independently as a succession of parties or
in electoral coalition with other minor leftist parties from 1995 onward.11 Particu-
larly since 2002, these two political tendencies have increasingly began to manifest
themselves as a regional two-party system in which the current governing Justice
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]) competes in close con-
test with the contemporary manifestation of the Kurdish leftish-nationalist party
(currently the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi [BDP]), but
at the time of the survey (2009), the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum
Partisi [DTP])) (Wuthrich 2011, 352).
In the general elections of 2002, a clean sweep was made of all incumbent parties
in parliament, thanks in part to the 10% national electoral threshold, and two parties
entered the Grand National Assembly on pro-EU party platforms, though these were
modestly expressed (Çarkoğlu 2003a, 248). The attitude toward EU membership
among the electoral support for these two parties was very different. As can be seen
by the survey results presented in Çarkoğlu’s (2003b, 174) study, while the CHP vot-
ers showed one of the highest levels of support for the EU (79%), the supporters of
the AKP showed one of the lowest levels of support (53%), second only to the
explicitly religiously oriented Felicity Party. Following the election, however, the
AKP, which has been portrayed particularly by the CHP’s grassroot secular-national-
ist supporters as a serious threat to Turkish secularism, attempted to legitimize itself,
at least in part, by whole-heartedly embracing the EU and the reforms needed to
speed up the process of accession. Within the socially-polarized environment, similar
approval and support by the CHP for the EU project could be seen as a legitimiza-
tion of their arch-rival; therefore, the party’s stance toward EU negotiations grew
continually sour, suggesting that EU reforms were simply a pretext to establish the
conditions for an Islamist transformation of the secularist State (Gülmez 2008; Yıl-
maz 2011, 12). Such a domestic context allows us to investigate the nature of the
relationship between political affiliation and support for EU membership.
In Çarkoğlu’s (2003b) study, arguably due to a mismatch of variables in his
regression model, no political party affiliation was associated with significant sup-
port or antagonism toward EU membership although the coefficient for CHP affilia-
tion was modestly positive while AKP and Kurdish leftist-nationalist party
affiliation was modestly negative. A later similar study by Çarkoğlu (2004), again
with a mismatched model and no significant coefficient, showed a positive coeffi-
cient for support for the EU among AKP supporters and the CHP, and a negative
coefficient again for the Kurdish leftist-nationalist party. Though these results can-
not be taken with any certainty, they pose interesting questions in light of the
broader comparative literature in regard to public opinion, politics and EU integra-
tion which will be discussed briefly below.
Public opinion and the EU
Within the broader comparative literature, there is a significant body of work
covering attitudes toward the EU and European integration in general, offering a






























potentially powerful roadmap to help set the framework for a study seeking to learn
the determinants of support among Turkish citizens.
These studies of public opinion toward the EU and the integration process have
largely come to focus on three major factors: utilitarian considerations, national
identity and political affiliation. A number of studies address utilitarian and eco-
nomic concerns as one of the primary independent variables. For example, Gabel
(1998) addressed five theories for support for European integration related to age,
income, occupation, partisanship and political values and found that utilitarian eco-
nomic concerns were the primary factor in determining how one felt about the inte-
gration process. A more recent study by Garry and Tilley (2009) argues that
economic factors condition the salience of identity as a determinant. In a study by
Hooghe and Marks (2005), the authors found that economic utilitarian concerns
were one of the significant determinants of support for integration along with iden-
tity and the effects of political party cueing. In a single country studying factors
affecting how the Swiss public views the EU, Christin and Trechsel (2002) investi-
gate how economic and social concerns might negatively influence one’s attitude
toward joining the EU. The fears of economic harm caused by joining the EU had
a significant and strong impact on Swiss attitudes. Importantly, in a work on Turkey
by Kentmen (2008), one of the rare studies on Turkish attitudes toward the EU
addressing the comparative public opinion literature, ‘perceived economic prospects’
of membership was found to be the strongest indicator of attitudes toward the EU
among Turkish citizens. Furthermore, at the national level in Turkey, Kalaycıoğlu
(2008) found that ‘expression of economic satisfaction’ was a significant determiner
of party affiliation in every case and the most significant factor determining affilia-
tion of those who support the current governing party, the AKP. These studies, both
in the literature in general and in the study of Turkey as a specific case, indicate
that economic and social utilitarian concerns would be critical variables to test in
further studies. From the studies above, we derive the following hypothesis regard-
ing the attitude of citizens in general toward the EU based on these concerns:
H1: Utilitarian considerations will be a significant factor determining the
attitudes of Turkish citizens toward EU membership.
Beyond cost/benefit analyses that influence public attitudes toward the EU, a
second factor extensively studied is national identity. A number of studies men-
tioned above also demonstrated the importance of national identity in shaping pub-
lic attitudes about the EU. Hooghe and Marks (2005) showed that an exclusive
national identity was the strongest factor at work among the other significant vari-
ables, being negatively related to support for integration. Christin and Trechsel
(2002) also showed feelings of national identity to have a negative effect on Swiss
opinion regarding the EU. Kentmen (2008), in her research related to Turkish public
opinion and EU membership, also demonstrated a negative interaction between
national identity and ideas about the EU. Furthermore, regarding religious identity,
she determined that religiosity was not a significant factor at all in attitudes toward
accession. This contrasts Çarkoğlu’s (2003b, 185, 2004, 38) studies which consis-
tently showed religiosity as a negatively-regressed determinant of EU support.
Two other studies looking at the impact of national identity on the EU should
also be examined. McLaren (2002) took the variables used in Gabel’s (1998) analy-
sis and added another variable to the model – fear of others. Utilizing Eurobarometer






























data related to attitudes toward immigrants, she measured the effects of this percep-
tion of cultural threat in relation to support for EU integration. The results showed
that fear of others indeed impacted public opinion toward the EU negatively.
Another study by Carey (2002) divided national identity into three separate strands,
intense feelings for one’s country, attachment toward the nation and territorial enti-
ties and the threat of other people or cultures encroaching on the nation. He analyses
them in separate models, but each type of feeling towards one’s nationality signifi-
cantly affected one’s view of EU integration. In addition and particularly relevant to
the question of Alevi support, he determined that ethnicities in a minority position in
a society viewed integration more positively than those of the ethnic majority.
The existing research on the EU and national identity draw us to a number of
points relevant to Turkey. We broke down national identity into two strands, intense
feelings for one’s country (patriotism) and fear of foreign threat. A further point for
consideration is the attitudes of non-dominant cultural groups like Alevis and Kurds
toward the EU. We present the following hypotheses:
H2: Strong feelings of national sentiment will negatively affect the support of
Turkish citizens for EU membership.
H3: Fear of outsiders will coincide with negative attitudes toward Turkey’s
EU accession.
H4: Identification with a non-dominant cultural group, such as an Alevis or
Kurds, will be a positive determinant of support for the EU.
The final factor of note in the literature regarding public opinion toward the EU
and European integration is political affiliation. Gabel’s (1998) study showed the
importance of partisanship in determining support for EU integration. Recently, a
number of scholars have studied whether the affiliation with party effect was pri-
marily a top–down or bottom–up issue. In other words, did public opinion entice
parties to behave a certain way toward Europe or was it party ‘cueing’ that shaped
public views toward the EU? Hooghe and Marks (2005) show ‘cueing’ to be signif-
icant though they do not clearly demonstrate that their measurement comes abso-
lutely from top–down processes. Ray (2003) argues that cueing takes place but that
it is also conditioned by a number of factors. When a party is not unified within
itself, its effects on the public are reduced. However, disagreement in views about
Europe across parties increases the power of party cueing. Furthermore, an individ-
ual’s level of attachment with the party affects the influence a party has to be able
to cue that person. Research has also shown (Steenbergen, Edwards, and de Vries
2007) that a party divided amongst itself leads to a divided constituency, a proposi-
tion also held by Gabel and Scheve (2007). They also acknowledge certain
conditions where public opinion could cue the parties.
Finally, several other studies of political effects on public opinion regarding the
EU are also relevant to the Turkish and Alevi case. Mattila and Raunio (2006) claim
that the power of parties to affect public opinion is stronger in smaller, politically
non-central parties. Furthermore, the strength of parties to affect the populace is
greater in newly emerging countries where membership is a relevant issue. In another
study, Jolly (2007) provides data to show that regional parties are more supportive of
EU integration than national parties. Although Kentmen (2008) did not have the data






























to measure party affiliation and support for the EU in her study, in other research con-
ducted in Turkey in 2002, Çarkoğlu (2003b, 2004) did not find party affiliation to be
a significant indicator in those particular analyses (though the coefficient was negative
in both cases), but his descriptive data and personal analysis suggested that support
for the EU might be significantly related to support for the now defunct Halkın Dem-
okrasi Partisi (HADEP), which is a de facto regional party largely seen to have been
serving the interests of Kurdish leftist-nationalists.
The research above points to a prediction that political party affiliation will be a
salient determiner of one’s attitude toward EU membership in Turkey. As parties
have varying stances toward the EU – although it is also true that no party rejects
the EU outright – we could assume that partisanship might play a role. As noted
previously, the AKP party leadership strongly advocates accession to the EU and
the negotiation process; the CHP, however, though strongly supporting membership
with the EU in the past has become much more ambivalent in their stance toward
the EU. The nationalist party, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (MHP), has also remained
ambivalent to negative toward the accession process. In Turkey, the only truly
regional party of note at the time that the survey was conducted was the Democratic
Society Party (DTP),12 which is supported by Kurdish leftist-nationalists in the
southeast. With these considerations in mind, we form the following hypotheses:
H5: Affiliation to the CHP will not be significantly indicative of an attitude
toward the EU.
H6: Supporters of the DTP will also support membership in the EU.
H7: Those who support the AKP will have positive attitudes about the EU.
H8: Supporters of the MHP will not support EU membership.
Method and data
In order to examine how attitudes among Alevis toward EU membership might be
affected, we created and conducted a survey with items addressing the issues above
along with a number of control variables. In order to ensure a sample that included
the views of Alevis and Kurds, we had to address a number of challenges. In research
in Turkey, it is not permissible to ask one’s ethnic identity or first language directly.
The closest proxy is asking them the language their mother spoke at home. There are
a number of problems with this. Many Turkish citizens who consider themselves eth-
nically Kurdish do not speak Kurdish well or at all. There are also those whose fathers
speak Kurdish and have inherited a strong Kurdish identity but who are not able to
identify themselves through the question. Thus, it is likely that not all Kurds partici-
pating in the survey were detected through the variable, and so the proxy leads to a
level of ‘blurriness’ in measuring opinions among citizens of Kurdish origin.
Some Alevis, as has been noted in other studies such as Çarkoğlu (2005), have
been notoriously evasive in volunteering their Alevi identity in previous research.
Thus, in order to access Alevi opinion with certainty and ensure some variety
within the Alevi community among the respondents, we distributed the surveys
through four large Alevi associations with divergent views and practices from one
another, Cem Vakfı, Hacı Bektaş Vakfı, Pir Sultan Abdal Kültür Derneği and Ehli
Beyt Vakfı. In each case, we discussed our study with the director of the associa-






























tion, explaining our research plan and obtaining consent and assistance in distribu-
tion. The surveys were distributed at a subsequent meeting or cem ceremony or
taken home and distributed among family members and Alevi friends, and we
returned later to pick up those completed.
Although resources were not available for a precisely random or representative
national sample, 340 surveys were distributed among the general populace in sev-
eral cities and communities with the intent to sufficiently cover all the independent
variables. The surveys were conducted between late April and early July 2009. Dur-
ing this period, there was no particularly salient issue regarding the EU on the
national news agenda. By the end of July and the beginning of August, the discus-
sion of a ‘Kurdish initiative’ ensued, and its association with EU reforms certainly
polarized public opinion in this regard, but the survey data were collected prior to
these developments. The net result of our survey distribution and gathering method
was 490 completed surveys, including 150 surveys by Alevis and 78 by those
whose mother spoke a dialect of Kurdish with overlap between these two groups.
For all the models, ordered logit regression was utilized through the statistical
package, STATA 9.1. The dependent variable, I strongly support Turkey’s entrance
into the European Union, was coded 1 to 5 on an ordinal scale including ‘strongly
agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’. The independent variables derived from the hypothe-
ses above were operationalized in the following ways. To measure utilitarian political
behavior, we gave two sets of statements, one relating to economic concerns and the
other to the solving of social problems. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree,
again on a 1 to 5 scale, as to the following two economically-focused statements:
A political party’s most important duty is to look after the economic benefit of his/her
fellow citizens.
In the elections, I give my vote to the party with the best economic plan for the
country.
The variables were converted to an index by taking a simple average of the two. A
nearly identical set was given related to addressing current social problems in the
country, and the same type of index was created for these. An index of the com-
bined utility score (social and economic) was calculated.
In order to get a measure for strong national sentiment (patriotism), respondents
were presented with the following statements on a 1 to 5 scale:
A Turk’s only friend is another Turk.
Love it (Turkey) or leave it.
When I see the Turkish flag, I feel happy.
These questions have also been used for indexes of nationalism in other studies in
Turkey (Çarkoğlu 2006), but, outside the first statement, seem to fall more in the
category of a type of patriotism or strong feelings of national identity as demarcated
by Carey (2002). A simple average was calculated and used as a ‘feelings of
national identity’ index. Beyond these questions, we also included a couple of items
that addressed the fear of encroachment by foreigners along a 1 to 5 scale:






























Foreigners residing in our country harm our culture.
Foreigners residing in our country make it harder to find jobs.
The average of these statements on a 1 to 5 scale, also used in Çarkoğlu’s study
(2006), was taken as the index for this issue of fear of foreign threat.
In determining political affiliation, we chose to focus on the five or six political
parties that were represented well enough within our survey sample to be consid-
ered. The parties currently in the Grand National Assembly – i.e. the AKP, the
CHP, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the DTP13 – were taken into account.
Due to its popularity among Alevis, the communist Türkiye Komünist Partisi
(TKP) was also included.14 The ultra-nationalist MHP had only one supporter
among the 150 Alevis measured but had plenty of support among the general popu-
lation that was surveyed. With each of these parties, we created a graduated scale
of affiliation based on responses to five items. The first three were a vote for the
party in the 2007 general election, the 2009 local election and their hypothetical
vote for a party if they had to vote today. The last two items required agreement to
the following statements:
My party choice will never change.
I feel closely connected to my party.
To create the index for affiliation, each positive response equalled a point on a 0 to
5 scale.
To control for other possible independent variables besides mother’s language at
home, items related to gender, place of longest residence (village, town, city, over-
seas and mixed) strength of religion as a source for views, education, income and
age were included in the survey.
Results
A perusal of the results in Table 1 confirms a number of our hypotheses set out
above while disconfirming others. Model 1 was conducted with the entire survey
sample. In measuring the variables against support for EU membership with the
entire survey set, several results of significance appeared. The dummy variable iden-
tifying the participant as Alevi turned out to be the most significant indicator for
EU support, followed by the aggregate variable measuring social and economic util-
itarian concerns. Income level also turned out to be mildly indicative for this model.
In terms of political affiliation, support for the AKP and DTP was a moderate indi-
cator of support for the EU while support for the communist party (TKP) was
related with negative attitudes toward EU membership. The supporters of MHP, the
nationalist party, in this model, had a negative coefficient approaching significance,
but the result is not as clear in the first model as in the second model with only
non-Alevis. Additionally, the fear of foreigners was negatively associated with sup-
port for accession. The party of Atatürk, the CHP, did not have a significant score
for EU support in this model.
In Model 2, only non-Alevi participants were measured for EU support. Among
this group, support for the TKP was again negatively regressed against support for






























the EU and a negative coefficient for support for the nationalist MHP became sig-
nificant. Although support for the AKP approached significance in its support for
the EU, it was just above the 5% of the threshold. The same can be said of the
CHP but in the negative direction. Once again, utilitarian concerns were positively
associated with EU support.
Table 1. Ordered logit regression results.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Total Non-Alevi Alevi
(O=361) (O=276) (O=142)
Dependent variable I Support for the EU
Predictors .
Age .016⁄ .013a .001
(.008) (.009) (.019)
Gender .220 .382a −.196
(.210) (.223) (.382)
Mother’s language – Turkish −1.272 −.576 −.726
(.745) (1.16) (.702)
Mother’s language – Kurdish −.727 .861 −.989
(.742) (1.23) (.712)
Alevi 1.015⁄⁄⁄ – –
(.317)
City dweller .310 .340 .049
(.329) (.466) (.493)
Village dweller .622 .337 .797
(.484) (.472) (.649)
Income .241⁄ .217a .114
(.116) (.113) (.162)
Education .038 .046 −.067
(.120) (.154) (.185)
Support EU membership – – –
AKP supporter .335⁄⁄ .165a 1.308⁄⁄⁄
(.123) (.113) (.409)
CHP supporter .016 −.128a .313⁄
(.079) (.086) (.144)
MHP supporter −.198 −.369⁄⁄ –
(.126) (.119)
DTP supporter .327⁄ −.274 .787⁄⁄⁄
(.141) (.275) (.202)
TKP supporter −.491⁄⁄⁄ −.746⁄⁄⁄ .019
(.150) (.179) (.191)
Views come from beliefs −.047 −.104 .060
(.108) (.122) (.189)
Feelings of national identity −.076 −.156 −.165
(.137) (.142) (.235)
Foreign threat −.345⁄ −.207 −.555⁄
(.151) (.155) (.265)
Utility aggregate .507⁄⁄ .475⁄⁄ 1.207⁄⁄⁄
(.166) (.162) (.323)
Left–right ideological scale .035 .155 −.003
(.116) (.090) (.178)
Pseudo R2 .107 .090 .151
Notes: Stata 9.1 was used in this research. ⁄Significant at <.05 level. ⁄⁄Significant at <.01 level. ⁄⁄ Sig-
nificant at a <.001 level.
aApproaching significance >.05<.15.






























Model 3 measures indicators of support among the Alevi participants. Interest-
ingly, the strongest coefficient (of all models) is the positive association for support
for the EU from supporters of the AKP. Next in significance is the utility aggregate
score, followed by support for the de facto regional and ethnic Kurdish DTP and
then support for the CHP. Interestingly, among Alevi’s, there was a strong negative
association between fear of foreign threat and support for the EU. Religiosity was
not a significant coefficient in any of the models.
In relation to our hypotheses set out above, the results bring both interesting
areas of convergence and divergence from our expectations. Our hypothesis that
utility would be an important indicator of EU support seems to be strongly con-
firmed. Across all models, it was a positively associated and significant variable.
Furthermore, its salience among Alevis seems to be stronger than among the gen-
eral populace.
Our hypotheses derived from the issues of feelings of national identity and fear
of foreigners were both confirmed and disconfirmed, in part, by the results. The
hypothesis that strong feeling of national identity would be negatively related to
support for the EU turned out to be largely disconfirmed. Although the beta scores
for this index in all the models were mildly negative, none were at all close to sig-
nificance. The only point that might provide some confirmation of this is that sup-
porters of the strongly nationalist MHP registered negative associations with EU
membership in both models in which it was included as a variable. This could
mean that the index was delineating a level of national identity that must be distin-
guished from the views of the supporters of the ultra-nationalist party (a likely pos-
sibility), or it could mean that the lack of support for the EU from MHP supporters
could lie in other or additional issues distinct from that of simple nationalism, such
as domestic political posturing by the party leadership.
That fear of foreign threat would be an indicator of negative support for the EU
was certainly confirmed by the results from the models. As an index, it discriminated
between support and lack of support for membership more effectively than the
nationalism index. Thus, strong personal feelings of national attachment seem less
an obstacle for the EU project than perspectives that focus on the identities of non-
Turkish citizens. Interestingly enough, this relationship between fear of foreigners
and lack of support for the EU appeared to be even stronger among Alevis. Further-
more, the hypothesis that religious views would not significantly impact one’s per-
spective about EU membership among Turkish citizens was confirmed. It registered
with high measures of insignificance in all the models, confirming what Kentmen
(2008) noted in her study. The variable for religiosity used was, however, correlated
strongly with supporters of the AKP (.390) and MHP (.216),15 which confirms most
other studies determining a similar relationship.
The results also shed some interesting light on the question of non-dominant
cultural groups’ attitudes toward the EU. While Alevi identity was a powerful indi-
cator of support for the EU, the same cannot be said for either the supporters of the
de facto (and now defunct) ethno-nationalist DTP or those who spoke a dialect of
Kurdish at home. Only Alevi supporters of the DTP seemed to be strongly related
to support for membership. Among the non-Alevi population, support for the DTP
tended toward negative attitudes toward the EU, surprisingly disconfirming that
particular hypothesis.
Outside of the unexpected results regarding the de facto regional DTP, the other
hypotheses predicting relationships between political parties and attitudes toward






























membership were confirmed. Support for the EU tended to be positive and signifi-
cant for supporters of the current governing AKP, while support for the CHP was
indeterminate, but when Alevis are removed, its negative coefficient approached
significance (p<.10). Support for the nationalist MHP was negatively associated
with the dependent variable. Although Alevi participants tended not to vote for the
AKP and showed tendencies to vote for parties associated with the left, the Alevis
that did vote for the current governing party had the strongest beta scores associated
with EU support.
Discussion
Although this study was relatively small in scope of number of surveys (just <500
total), perhaps one of the most interesting findings is that the salient factors influ-
encing public opinion among Turkish citizens in general quite closely paralleled the
determinants observed in much wider contexts. Just as Hooghe and Marks (2005)
demonstrated from the results of their research, utilitarian concerns, identity and
political affiliation are important factors influencing how EU membership is viewed
in Turkey. In the present study, the determination of the salience of political factors
(hitherto not systematically analysed in this fashion) along with initial results
regarding non-dominant cultural group attitudes seems to be a significant contribu-
tion in addition to its confirmation of the significance of utilitarian concerns and
fears of foreign encroachment.
In this period of Turkey’s history, politics is very important; it is not surpris-
ing, therefore, for party affiliation to be such a strong determinant of support for
the EU. Turkish society is experiencing numerous changes, of which membership
in the EU would be a significant one, and the country stands at the threshold of
a number of quite distinct trajectories, which are viewed in very different ways
by various segments of the population. The polarizing behaviours of political
elites have established deep cleavages that seem quite difficult to bridge. Within
such an environment, how the EU question is appropriated into the political
debate is an intriguing one. The question prompted by such results is whether or
not parties are cueing the attitudes of their constituents or whether the voters are
grouping themselves under the umbrellas of parties that align with their views of
the EU.
We would propose that, in the current domestic political climate, there is
strong reason to believe the former assertion – i.e. that it is indeed cueing. This
research coupled with existing research seems to indicate that views toward the
EU are shifting with time in conformity with the attitudes cued by the leaders of
the parties. If one takes into account the study by Çarkoğlu (2003b), conducted
months before the AKP came to power, the descriptive statistics indicate that the
supporters of the CHP in 2002 were one of the strongest groups in favour of
EU membership while supporters of the untested AKP registered as second to
lowest among all the parties. That study also showed that religiosity was nega-
tively related to support for the EU. Our study clearly indicates that when Alevis
are removed from CHP supporters in Model 2, the coefficient becomes negative
at a level approaching significance. A recent work by Hale and Özbudun (2010,
36) cites an unpublished study by Hakan Yılmaz that also shows that, from 2002
to 2006, the support for the EU among AKP supporters rose by 20% while it
concurrently declined by 23% among CHP supporters. That the AKP party lead-






























ers have supported the EU project from the outset is no mystery (although their
apparently waning enthusiasm has become a recent topic of debate), but the nor-
mal descriptions of their constituency suggest a population that, in most coun-
tries, would not strongly support membership in a European body. Correlations
between religiosity and other variables and indices in this study show a signifi-
cant relationship between this group and fear of foreign encroachment, strong
national identity, support for the nationalist MHP and rightward positioning on
the left–right self-placement,16 relationships that might normally anticipate a nega-
tive attitude toward the EU. The key off-setting variable could be argued to be
this group’s strong correlation with support for the AKP, the party most commit-
ted to the EU membership project. This seems to confirm a proposition by Dağı
(2006) who argued that the AKP’s shaping of their conservative constituency’s
attitude toward the west and the EU could be argued as one of the party’s most
important contributions to Turkish politics and society. Thus, political cueing
could be argued to play an important role in the attitudes of Turkish citizens to
the EU. However, such a conclusion also suggests that the party’s apparent EU-
fatigue is also likely to be transmitted to their social support base.
Another interesting question arises from the divergence in results between Ale-
vis and the proxies variables for Kurds in Turkey (mother tongue and support for
the DTP), for which the general literature on minority group attitudes toward the
EU would anticipate similar attitudes toward EU membership. Why Alevis seem
to be more clearly supportive of the EU in this study, such that it seemed to over-
ride political affiliation, as compared to Kurds becomes an interesting question.
While some studies, such as Çarkoğlu (2003b), have suggested a high amount of
support among Kurds and those who support de facto regional parties of the
southeast, in both his studies and this current one, when Kurdish identity placed
as a variable in a regression model, the coefficients tend toward the negative,
especially if one controls for Kurdish Alevis. The historical pattern of behaviour
among Kurds in Turkey has consistently shown marked intra-group disagreement
on significant political matters, including political party of choice; it is likely that
such a divergence also exists in relation to the question of supporting or opposing
EU membership. This study is not comprehensive enough to generate certain con-
clusions, but the strong divergence among these Alevi and Kurdish participants
warrants further attention in future studies. If further studies are conducted, it
would likely be fruitful to also measure differences based on intra-group distinc-
tions similar to the study by Campbell (2004), measuring differences in political
activism among various Christian denominations in the USA. This might be partic-
ularly interesting among Alevis.
This research also seems to indicate that, to the extent that attitudes are shaped
from political cueing by party leaders, current attitudes among various party sup-
porters could again change depending on the domestic and international political
climate. Will the party of Atatürk, the CHP, once again face more determinedly
‘West’ as its founder once did? Has the AKP changed the values and attitudes of
many of the conservatives in Turkey forever, or is this too a mirage of a contingent
context? Will the widely disseminated views in Turkey of xenophobes in Europe
who are against Turks and Turkish membership in the EU eventually overcome
Turkish citizens’ strong dispositions toward utilitarian and functional interests? The
answers to these will only be determined with the passing of time.
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Notes
1. Scholars range in their estimates anywhere from 10 to 25%. Poyraz (2005) notes that
Alevis themselves have claimed 30–40%.
2. For an interesting study analyzing how other national parties in Europe take positions on
Turkey’s accession based on such strategic and structural factors rather than ideology,
see Chatzistavrou (2010).
3. The authors have intentionally chose to avoid the term ‘minority’ for several reasons
though this term could (and has) been widely appropriated in discussions about Kurds and
Alevis. While it is true that the Turkish state does not formally recognize these groups as
minorities, it is also true that many members of these groups, particularly among Alevis,
do not appreciate being identified as a ‘minority’ either. Stemming from policies employed
toward the end of the Ottoman Empire, the designation of ‘minority’ has become an
expression that results in further marginalization and isolation of the targeted group. Thus,
the apparent ‘benefits’ of minority status are seen as far inferior to the cost of being
socially labeled as a ‘second-class citizen’ and ‘potential traitor’. For this reason, the
authors felt that the expression ‘non-dominant’ cultural groups/communities would suffice.
4. There are a number of interesting and detailed studies regarding the particular case and
developments regarding Turkey’s EU relations. For a broader picture of the individual
case, see the collected works of Çarkoğlu and Rubin (2003) and Uğur and Canefe (2004).
5. For a number of excellent studies on Alevis, see the collected work by Olsson, Özdalga,
and Raudvere (2003) and the ethnographic study by Shankland (2003).
6. As indicated by Melikoff (2003, 6), the distinction between the groups was more in
regard to social practices rather than belief. While the Bektaş community tended to
engage in a more sedentary life and organized ritualized religious practice centered
around lodges (tekke), the Kızılbaş tended to be more nomadic and flexible in religious
practice, infusing local folklore into existing religious legends.
7. Sometimes referred to as Selim, the Grim by English historians or Yavuz Sultan Selim
in Turkish.
8. For a broader survey and debate on the Kurds in Turkey, see Kirişçi and Winrow
(1997), Barkey and Fuller (1998), McDowall (2004), Heper (2007), and in Turkish,
Yeğen (1999).
9. For more about the composition of these elites, see Zürcher (2005).
10. Approximately 20% of Alevis are Kurdish, see Poyraz (2005).
11. The parties formed by these political elites have been regularly closed down by the
Constitutional Court. They have existed as the People’s Labor Party (Halkın Emek
Partisi), the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi), the People’s Democracy Party
(HADEP), the Democratic People’s Party (Demokratik Halk Partisi), the Democratic
Society Party (DTP), and, as of 2009, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).
12. The DTP was closed in December 2009 by the Constitutional Court for ‘undemocratic’
behavior and support for terrorism.
13. This is true for the time during which the survey was distributed (see Note 8).
14. Turkish Communist Party.
15. Two-tailed Pearson coefficient with a significance of .000 for both.
16. Two-tailed Pearson coefficients, .339, .327, .216, and .322 respectively all with .000
significance.
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